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FAKE NEWS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
RECONCILING A DISCONNECT BETWEEN THEORY AND
DOCTRINE
By
Clay Calvert,* Stephanie McNeff,**
Austin Vining,‡ & Sebastian Zarate‡‡

Abstract

This Article analyzes calls for regulating so-called
“fake news” through the lens of both traditional
theories of free expression – namely, the
marketplace of ideas and democratic selfgovernance – and two well-established First
Amendment doctrines, strict scrutiny and
underinclusivity. The Article argues there is, at
first glance, a seeming disconnect between theory
and doctrine when it comes to either censoring or
safeguarding fake news. The Article contends,
however, that a structural rights interpretation of
the First Amendment offers a viable means of
reconciling theory and doctrine. A structural
rights approach focuses on the dangers of
collective power in defining the truth, rather than
on the benefits that messages provide to society or
individuals.
Ultimately, a structural rights
conception illustrates why, at the level of free
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speech theory, the government must not censor fake
news.
INTRODUCTION
“And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the
earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and
prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple;
who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?” 1
John Milton penned this often-quoted passage more than 370 years
ago, planting the seed for “the oldest of the rationales for the principle of
freedom of expression”2—the metaphorical marketplace of ideas. 3
Unfortunately, he never could have imagined the hoopla, 4 if not utter
panic, among some people regarding fake news in the months
surrounding the 2016 United States presidential election. 5
Indeed, a January 2017 report by U.S. intelligence officials concluded
that Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin, deployed “an aggressive mix
of digital thefts and leaks, fake news and propaganda”6 to disrupt the
2016 presidential campaign and to tilt it in favor of Republican Donald
J. Trump. For some liberals and Democrats, fake news became a reason
– more cynically, an excuse – why Hillary Clinton lost to Trump. 7

1. J OHN MILTON , AREOPAGITICA: A S PEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED P RINTING
45 (MacMillan 1959) (H.B. Cotterill, ed.) (1644).
2. C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment is Not Preferred: The Military and Other
“Special Contexts,” 56 U. CIN . L. REV . 779, 786 (1988).
3. See RODNEY A. S MOLLA, F REE S PEECH IN AN OPEN S OCIETY 6 (1992) (“The
‘marketplace of ideas’ is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech tradition.”).
4. Nina Agrawal, Back Story; Where Fake News Came From, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2016, at A2
(“Despite all the hoopla about fake news – President Obama has denounced it and Facebook has pledged
to rein in websites that spread it – the phenomenon is not new”) (emphasis added).
5. See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, Media’s Next Challenge: Overcoming the Threat of Fake News,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2016, at B1 (“The internet-borne forces that are eating away at print advertising are
enabling a host of faux-journalistic players to pollute the democracy with dangerously fake news
items.”) (emphasis added); Margaret Sullivan, Sick of the News? This is No Time to Tune Out, WASH.
POST, Dec. 8, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/sick-of-the-news-this-is-no-timeto-tune-out/2016/12/08/97ff1e70-bd61-11e6-91ee-1adddfe36cbe_story.html8,
2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/sick-of-the-news-this-is-no-time-to-tuneout/2016/12/08/97ff1e70-bd61-11e6-91ee-1adddfe36cbe_story.html (asserting that the United States
today is facing “the era of fake news causing real trouble”) (emphasis added).
6. Brian Bennett, Report Points to Putin, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2016, at A1 (emphasis added).
7. Michael Wolff, Fake News is a Real Pawn in Claims of Media Bias; New Genre Targets an
Unsuspecting, Susceptible Audience, USA TODAY, Dec. 12, 2016, at 1B (asserting that “the ‘fake news’
notion has become part of the epistemological phenomenon offered by liberal media to explain why
Donald Trump was elected and, therefore, to discredit that election. In this, fake news becomes part of a
broader conspiracy theory of unseen forces manipulating a gullible public”); Teri Sforza, Fake News
Has Real Impact, DAILY NEWS (L.A., Cal.), Dec. 18, 2016, at A1 (“How big a problem is it? On the
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For example, John Herrman contended in the New York Times that
“[f]or many people, and especially opponents of President-elect Donald
J. Trump, the attention paid to fake news and its role in the election has
provided a small relief, the discovery of the error that explains
everything.”8 A USA Today column also declared that fake news “on
social media is what a growing chorus of journalists, liberals and tech
leaders at least partially blame for Donald Trump’s election victory.” 9
Steve Deace, a conservative radio talk-show host, opined in the same
column that “the Trump campaign shamelessly rode a wave of fake
news sites to help it corral a gullible public.” 10 On the other end of the
political spectrum, left-leaning New York Times columnist Paul
Krugman similarly considered fake news to be a big problem. 11
More significantly, Hillary Clinton asserted in December 2016 that an
“epidemic of malicious fake news” 12 posed “a danger that must be
addressed and addressed quickly.” 13 The former presidential nominee
even “voiced support for some federal legislation to address the ‘fake
news’ issue.”14
In fact, the Federal Trade Commission has targeted fake news
websites designed to sell “bogus weight-loss products”15 and acai berry
supplements as forms of deceptive advertising. 16 However, the
left, some say fake news pushed people to make Donald Trump the most powerful man on Earth.”).
8. John Herrman, Fixation on Fake News Overshadows Waning Trust in Real Reporting, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/business/media/exposing-fake-newseroding-trust-in-real-reporting.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/business/media/exposing-fakenews-eroding-trust-in-real-reporting.html.
9. Steve Deace, Who Left Us Vulnerable to Fake News?, USA TODAY, Nov. 25, 2016, at 13A.
10. Id.
11. See Paul Krugman, The Age of Fake Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2016, at A19,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/opinion/the-age-of-fake-policy.html (“And I’m not talking about
‘fake news,’ as big a problem as that is becoming; I’m talking about respectable, mainstream news
coverage.”) (emphasis added).
12. Noam Scheiber et al., Trump is Still Not Very Popular, and His Problem with Women Could
Return, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/us/politics/donald-trumptransition.html.
13. Id.
14. Paul Kane, Hillary Clinton Attacks ‘Fake News’ in Post-election Appearance on Capitol
Hill,
WASH .
P OST ,
Dec.
8.
2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/12/08/hillary-clinton-attacks-fake-news-inpost-election-appearance-on-capitol-hill.
15. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Charges Marketers Used Massive Spam
Campaign to Pitch Bogus Weight-Loss Products (June 6, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2016/06/ftc-charges-marketers-used-massive-spam-campaign-pitch-bogus.
16. See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Permanently Stops Fake News Website
Operator that Allegedly Deceived Consumers about Acai Berry Weight-Loss Products (Feb. 7, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/02/ftc-permanently-stops-fake-news-websiteoperator-allegedly (“The marketers behind an online scheme that the Federal Trade Commission
charged with deceptively using fake news websites to market acai berry supplements and other weightloss products have agreed to pay more than $1.6 million in settlements that will permanently halt their
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possibility of a law banning or censoring fake news unrelated to product
ads raises significant First Amendment 17 hurdles. Those concerns are
particularly problematic to the extent that fake news affects politics, as
was feared during the 2016 presidential election. Political speech, after
all, resides at the core of the First Amendment. 18
Addressing some of the dangers to free speech posed by regulating
fake news, former U.S. Congressman and presidential candidate Ron
Paul asserts that “[t]he latest, and potentially most dangerous, threat to
the First Amendment is the war on ‘fake news.’ Those leading the war
are using a few ‘viral’ internet hoaxes to justify increased government
regulation – and even outright censorship – of internet news sites.”19 He
adds that “[t]hose calling for bans on ‘fake news’ are not just trying to
censor easily disproved Internet hoaxes. They are working to create a
government-sanctioned ‘gatekeeper’ with the power to censor any news
or opinion displeasing to the political establishment.”20
Fake news and its suppression are clearly controversial. Precisely
what constitutes fake news, however, is murky. There is no single,
agreed upon definition.21 One New York Times story reports that fake
news is “widely understood to refer to fabricated news accounts that are
meant to spread virally online.” 22 Yet Carl Cannon, executive editor of
RealClearPolitics, observes that “the definition is vague” 23 and that the
term “is being used promiscuously.” 24
Others also contend that “‘fake news’ is fuzzy. It can refer to a
multitude of problems, including disinformation, propaganda, [and]
operation.”).
17. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated more than ninety years ago through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local
government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
18. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010) (“If the First Amendment has
any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply
engaging in political speech.”); Monitor Patriot v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (observing that when
it comes to the First Amendment freedom of speech, “it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional
guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
office”).
19. Ron Paul, Fake News, Free Speech, P UB. OPINION (Chambersburg, Pa.), Dec. 14, 2016, at
A9,
reprinted at http://www.publicopiniononline.com/story/opinion/2016/12/13/fake-news-freespeech/95366720.
20. Id.
21. Ethan Baron, Google Hasn’t Kept Ads Off Sites Peddling Fake News, D AYTON DAILY NEWS
(Ohio), Dec. 17, 2016, at A8 (observing that “defining ‘fake’ news can be difficult”).
22. Jeremy W. Peters, Wielding Claims of ‘Fake News,’ Conservatives Take Aim at Mainstream
Media, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2016, at A11.
23. Carl M. Cannon, The Age of Disinformation, DAILY NEWS (L.A., Cal.), Dec. 18, 2016, at
A15.
24. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss1/3

4

Calvert et al.: Fake News and the First Amendment: Reconciling a Disconnect Betwe

2018]

FAKE NEWS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

103

conspiracy-mongering.”25 Fake news can even sweep up satirical news
articles.26 At its broadest, fake news is “an all-purpose insult for news
coverage a person doesn’t like.”27
Conversely, when “[n]arrowly defined, ‘fake news’ means a made-up
story with an intention to deceive, often geared toward getting clicks.” 28
In a similarly narrow vein, Washington Post columnist Margaret
Sullivan calls fake news “deliberately constructed lies, in the form of
news articles, meant to mislead the public.” 29
For purposes of this Article, fake news is narrowly defined. It
includes only articles that suggest, by both their appearance and
content, 30 the conveyance of real news,31 and that knowingly include at
least one material32 factual assertion that is empirically verifiable as

25. Margaret Sullivan, Feds Should Stay out of Fight Against Fake News, WASH. POST, Dec. 16,
2016, at C1.
26. Abby Ohlheiser, How the War Against Fake News Backfired, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/12/07/how-the-war-against-fake-newsbackfired.
27. Neil Irwin, Fake News? Welcome to ‘False Remembering,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2017, at
2017, at A3. President Donald Trump, for instance, broadly tars and feathers entire news media outlets
as fake news organizations. For example, in February 2017 he tweeted, “The fake news media is going
crazy with their conspiracy theories and blind hatred. @MSNBC & @CNN are unwatchable.
@foxandfriends is great!” David Jackson & Kevin Johnson, White House Faces an Onslaught, USA
TODAY, Feb. 16, 2017, at 1A. See Nicholas Kristof, What Did Trump Know?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2017, at A27 (noting that “Trump lashes out wildly at ‘the fake news media’ without answering
questions”).
28. Sabrina Tavernise, As Fake News Spreads Lies, More Readers Shrug at Truth, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2016, at A1.
29. Margaret Sullivan, It’s Time to Retire the Tainted Term ‘Fake News,’ WASH. POST, Jan. 8,
2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/its-time-to-retire-the-tainted-term-fakenews/2017/01/06/a5a7516c-d375-11e6-945a-76f69a399dd5_story.html?utm_term=.146db39702b1.
30. This part of the definition, regarding what an article suggests by its appearance and content,
employs a reasonable reader standard akin to that in defamation law. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker
Mag., Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 515 (1991) (concluding that the meaning of a statement in defamation law
must be made “by reference to the meaning a statement conveys to a reasonable reader”); Lynch v. New
Jersey Educ. Ass’n, 735 A.2d 1129 (N.J. 1999) (“If a statement has more than a literal meaning, the
critical consideration is what a reasonable reader would understand the statement to mean.”).
31. Defining “news” as a stand-alone concept is itself difficult, of course. See, e.g., Robert M.
Entman, The Nature and Sources of News, in THE PRESS 48, 51 (Geneva Overholser & Kathleen Hall
Jamieson eds. 2005) (“Journalists, scholars, and educated people have long thought of news as a more or
less self-evident category of media product – the stuff that appears in newspapers, newsmagazines, or on
TV shows that have the word ‘news’ in their titles.”); KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & KARLYN KOHRS
CAMPBELL, THE INTERPLAY OF INFLUENCE: NEWS, ADVERTISING, POLITICS AND THE INTERNET 40 (6th
ed. 2006) (“Just what is news? Despite many efforts, no neat, satisfactory answer to that question can
be given.”). A complete discussion of what constitutes news is beyond the scope of this Article.
32. The idea that fake news, under this definition, must involve “material” falsity – rather than
minor falsity – borrows, in part, from a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision affecting defamation law.
See Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852, 861 (2014) (“Indeed, we have required more than
mere falsity to establish actual malice: The falsity must be ‘material.’”). Additionally, the Federal Trade
Commission uses a materiality standard in considering if a misrepresentation or omission of a fact is
actionable. See Fanning v. FTC, 821 F.3d 164, 172 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 648
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false and that is not otherwise protected by the fair report privilege. 33
Put slightly differently, to constitute fake news under this definition, an
article’s publisher must act with the subjective state of mind that
satisfies the first half of the actual malice test adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.34 That facet of
actual malice requires proving an article was published “with knowledge
that it was false.”35 The definition’s notion of verifiable falsity, which
also borrows from libel law,36 reflects the idea that fake news, as used
here, does not pertain to expressions of opinion.
For example, the much publicized story that Pope Francis endorsed
Trump for president fits this Article’s definition of fake news. 37 First, it
was a factual assertion and, in turn, one that was verified as false by the
Pope proclaiming at a news conference “he would not endorse any
candidate.”38 Second, the falsity was material because such an
endorsement might well have influenced some voters. Third, the story’s
creators published it knowing it was false. 39
(Jan. 9, 2017) (“The FTC Act imposes liability for misrepresentations only if they are material.”); Kraft,
Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 970 F.2d 311, 322 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A claim is considered material if it
‘involves information that is important to consumers and, hence, likely to affect their choice of, or
conduct regarding a product.’”) (quoting In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, *107 (1984)).
33. Exempting falsities that fall within the scope of the fair report privilege from the statute’s
definition of fake news is both strategic and crucial. That’s because the fair report privilege – in stark
contrast to fake news – actually “promotes our system of self-governance by serving the public’s
interest in official proceedings.” Solaia Tech., LLC v. Specialty Publ’g Co., 852 N.E.2d 825, 842 (Ill.
2006). As Dean Rodney Smolla explains, “[t]he rationale for the privilege is of considerable vintage,
but remains as relevant as ever: The reporter is a surrogate for the public, permitting it to observe
through the reporter’s eyes how the business of government is being conducted.” RODNEY A. SMOLLA,
THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 8:67 (2d ed., Rel. 25, Apr. 2012). Put differently, the fair report privilege
exists to enlighten voters, not to confuse them. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977)
(“The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or
proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if
the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.”).
34. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
35. Id. at 280. The second half of the test for actual malice asks whether the publisher of an
article acted “with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id.
36. See Kahn v. Bower, 284 Cal. Rptr. 244, 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (observing that “it is a
question of law for the court whether a challenged statement is reasonably susceptible of an
interpretation which implies a provably false assertion of actual fact”) (emphasis added).
37. See Paul Davidson & Kevin McCoy, Top 10 Business Stories of 2016, USA TODAY, Dec. 29,
2016, at 1B (“A post-election analysis by BuzzFeed found that fake stories shared on Facebook
outperformed real news stories during the final three months of the campaign cycle. The most shared
story was a fake report about Pope Francis’ endorsement of then-Republican nominee Trump.”); David
Zurawik, Fake News a Symptom of Sickness in Media Ecosystem, BALT. S UN, Nov. 20, 2016, at E1
(identifying the story that Pope Francis endorsed Donald Trump as one of the two biggest false election
stories).
38. Agrawal, supra note 4, at A2.
39. The story was created on a website called WTOE 5 News that “owns up to being a fake news
website.” Sydney Schaedel, Did the Pope Endorse Trump?, F ACTCHECK.ORG, Oct. 24, 2016,
http://www.factcheck.org/2016/10/did-the-pope-endorse-trump.
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With this definition and example of fake news in mind, the Article
explores the constitutionality of a hypothetical federal statute that: (1)
criminalizes the knowing40 creation and dissemination in interstate
commerce41 of fake news42 that purports to be about matters of public
concern;43 and (2) is intended to serve the dual interests of preventing
confused decision-making in voting choices and safeguarding
democratic self-governance during the voting process.44 The Article
analyzes this fictional statute from the perspective of both the First
Amendment doctrine and the free speech theory.
Specifically, the Article argues that while such a statute almost
certainly is unconstitutional under the doctrines of strict scrutiny and
underinclusiveness, traditional understandings of both the marketplace
of ideas and democratic self-governance theories of free expression do
not support shielding fake news from government censorship. For
instance, if in philosopher-educator Alexander Meiklejohn’s view the
twin points of ultimate interest in protecting political speech are “the
minds of the hearers”45 and “the voting of wise decisions,” 46 then fake
news goes unprotected because it potentially confuses the minds of
40. The “knowing” requirement is mandated per the necessity of a mens rea component in a
criminal statute such as the hypothetical one considered here. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
2001, 2009 (2015) (“The ‘central thought’ is that a defendant must be ‘blameworthy in mind’ before he
can be found guilty, a concept courts have expressed over time through various terms such as mens rea,
scienter, malice aforethought, guilty knowledge, and the like.”) (quoting Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952)) (emphasis in original).
41. The movement of these messages in interstate commerce provides the jurisdictional peg for
federal regulation. See Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1624 (2016) (“In our federal system,
‘Congress cannot punish felonies generally’; it may enact only those criminal laws that are connected to
one of its constitutionally enumerated powers, such as the authority to regulate interstate commerce.”)
(citation omitted).
42. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (defining fake news for purposes of this
statute). The statute applies only to the original creator and publisher of the story, not to individuals or
entities that later forward it to others. The statute includes a defense for publishers of satire if those
publishers make it clear, either on their home pages or with disclaimers in the articles themselves, that
their articles are satire and not to be taken seriously. A complete discussion of these provisions is
beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on the apparent disconnect between First Amendment
theory and doctrine when it comes to any efforts to regulate fake news.
43. To eliminate the issue of the possible vagueness of the term “public concern,” the statute
adopts and incorporates the U.S. Supreme Court’s own definition adopted in Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.
443 (2011). The Court held in Snyder that “[s]peech deals with matters of public concern when it can
‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,’ . .
. or when it ‘is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and
concern to the public.’” Id. at 453 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983), and San Diego
v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004)) (citations omitted).
44. These two interests are asserted here because they reflect the genuine concerns of many
people that fake news may have affected voters and influenced the outcome of the 2016 presidential
election. Supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
45. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25
(1948).
46. Id.
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those who hear it. In turn, fake news may cause them to vote unwisely.
Furthermore, in Meiklejohn’s words, “what is essential is not that
everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.” 47
Those who create fake news, as defined in this Article, can be censored
as speakers under a Meiklejohnian view because fake news simply is not
worth saying.
In brief, First Amendment doctrine seemingly protects fake news but
free speech theory, at first blush, does not. This Article concludes,
however, that by adopting what the late Professor Steven Gey called “a
structural rights interpretation of the First Amendment,” 48 rather than
“our persistent reliance on an individual rights conception,”49 one can
reconcile doctrine and theory such that both safeguard fake news from
censorship. As Gey later asserted, “[t]he structural rights perspective
does a much better job of explaining the expansive scope and speechprotectiveness of modern First Amendment jurisprudence than the
individual rights justifications that the Court continues to rely on in its
opinions.”50
Part I of this Article initially provides an overview of the strict
scrutiny and underinclusiveness doctrines. 51 It also argues that the
hypothetical statute regulating fake news described above would likely
be unconstitutional under those two standards. This is especially
probable in light of the Supreme Court’s rigorous and newfound “direct
causal link”52 requirement between speech and harm, as well as its
decision in United States v. Alvarez53 suggesting that counterspeech
typically is the proper remedy for correcting certain deliberate
falsehoods.54 Part II then offers a brief overview of the marketplace of
ideas and democratic self-governance theories of free expression, and it
avers that neither theory shields fake news from government
regulation. 55
Next, Part III argues that this seeming disconnect – First Amendment
doctrine safeguarding fake news from censorship versus free speech
theory offering, at most, negligible support for protecting it – is

47. Id.
48. Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless Untruths,
36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2008).
49. Id. at 3.
50. Steven G. Gey, The Procedural Annihilation of Structural Rights, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 10
(2009).
51. Infra notes 59-180 and accompanying text.
52. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011); United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.
Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012).
53. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
54. See id. at 2549.
55. Infra notes 181-257 and accompanying text.
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reconciled by embracing a structural rights interpretation of the First
Amendment. 56 Finally, Part IV concludes that private efforts to combat
fake news, including counterspeech, self-regulation and media-literacy
education, are far superior to creating a government agency vested with
Orwellian authority57 to determine what news is true and false and, in
turn, to censor the latter.58
I. A DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS OF CENSORING F AKE NEWS:
WHY THE HYPOTHETICAL STATUTE F AILS STRICT SCRUTINY
AND IS F ATALLY UNDERINCLUSIVE
This Part has two sections. Section A initially examines the
hypothetical fake news statute through the lens of strict scrutiny, while
Section B addresses issues of underinclusivity.
A.

Strict Scrutiny

A trio of well-established tests – strict scrutiny, 59 intermediate
scrutiny, 60 and rational basis review61 – generally governs as-applied
56. Infra notes 258-290 and accompanying text.
57. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992) (1949). The book’s
protagonist, Winston Smith, works for the fictional and totalitarian government of Oceania’s Ministry of
Truth, which, as the late Chief Justice of the United States William Rehnquist once wrote, “deals in
lies.” William H. Rehnquist, Survey of Book, 102 MICH. L. REV. 981, 981 (2004) (reviewing GEORGE
ORWELL, 1984) (Plume, Centennial Ed. 2003) (1949).
58. Infra notes 291-312 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 72-79 (describing strict scrutiny in greater detail).
60. See Leslie Kendrick, Nonsense on Sidewalks: Content Discrimination in McCullen v.
Coakley, 2014 S UP. CT. REV. 215, 238 (2014) (remarking that intermediate scrutiny “has historically
required that the law be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest’ and that it leave
open ‘ample alternative channels of communication’”) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989)); R. George Wright, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A
Distinction That is No Longer Worth the Fuss, 67 F LA. L. REV. 2081, 2084 (2015) (noting that “contentneutral regulations commonly receive less exacting, less demanding, mid-level judicial scrutiny” that
typically requires the government to demonstrate “a significant or substantial government interest”
being served by a “reasonable or proportionate” statute that leaves open ample alternative modes of
communication).
61. Variations of rational basis review are limited in First Amendment jurisprudence to special
settings and groups of individuals, such as the speech rights of prison inmates and public school
students. See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that “when a prison regulation impinges
on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests”); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (concluding “that
educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”); see also David M. Shapiro, Lenient in Theory, Dumb in
Fact: Prison, Speech, and Scrutiny, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 972, 982 (2016) (calling the Turner test for
prisoner speech rights “a standard much lower than the strict scrutiny or even intermediate scrutiny
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challenges in First Amendment jurisprudence. 62
Strict scrutiny,
ostensibly the most rigorous test, 63 pertains to content-based speech
restrictions. 64 The U.S. Supreme Court recently explained in Reed v.
Town of Gilbert65 that a law is content based if it “applies to particular
speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message
expressed”66 or “target[s] speech based on its communicative content.” 67
Writing for the Reed majority, Justice Clarence Thomas added that “the
phrase ‘content based’ requires a court to consider whether a regulation
of speech ‘on its face’ draws distinctions based on the message a
speaker conveys.”68
This Article’s hypothetical statute regulating fake news 69 easily falls
within this definition. It not only targets a particular type of message
and topic – fake news70 – but also restrains fake news that concerns only
specific subjects – namely, matters of public concern. 71 Thus, the
statute is content based and subject to strict scrutiny.

ordinarily applied to First Amendment claims in other contexts”); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the
New Three Rs – Repression, Rights, and Respect: A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L.
REV. 119, 122 (1995) (dubbing the Court’s Hazelwood standard “essentially a rational basis test” and
adding that “when school-sponsored speech is involved, government need act with only minimal
rationality”).
62. See R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny,
Intermediate Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 291 (2016) (noting that
modern doctrine utilizes “strict scrutiny, intermediate review, [and] ‘reasonableness’ balancing”);
Christina E. Wells, Trends in First Amendment Jurisprudence: Beyond Campaign Finance: The First
Amendment Implications of Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 66 MO. L. REV. 141, 158
(2001) (describing a “multi-tiered system of judicial review” in constitutional law consisting “of three
levels of scrutiny – strict, intermediate, and rational basis – all of which share the same general
structure”).
63. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015) (upholding a state judicial
canon in the face of strict scrutiny, but calling the result “one of the rare cases in which a speech
restriction withstands strict scrutiny”) (emphasis added); but see Matthew D. Bunker et al., Strict in
Theory, But Feeble in Fact? First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM.
L. & POL’Y 349, 377 (2011) (contending strict scrutiny “is arguably a weaker judicial tool today for
measuring the constitutionality of laws targeting speech than it was in the past. Although still strongly
protective of expression, there is at least some evidence that the test lacks the rigor for which it once was
noted”).
64. See David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359, 363
(2015) (noting “the longstanding default rule that strict scrutiny applies to content-based restrictions on
speech”).
65. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
66. Id. at 2227.
67. Id. at 2226.
68. Id. at 2227.
69. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (setting forth the hypothetical statute).
70. See supra notes 30-33 (providing the hypothetical statute’s definition of fake news).
71. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (limiting the hypothetical statute’s reach to speech
about matters of “public concern” and invoking the U.S. Supreme Court’s definition of that term from
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)).
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In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,72 the Court held
that a statute survives strict scrutiny only if “it is justified by a
compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that
interest.”73 This test involves two prongs: (1) proving a compelling
interest, and (2) demonstrating that the means serving it are sufficiently
narrowly tailored. 74
To satisfy the first part, the government “must specifically identify an
‘actual problem’ in need of solving”75 and prove there is, in fact, “a
direct causal link between”76 the regulated speech and the harm it
allegedly causes. As the Court wrote in United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group,77 “the Government must present more than
anecdote and supposition.”78 Furthermore, the late Justice Antonin
Scalia pointed out in Brown that even when a causal effect is proven, it
does not justify regulation if the impact is “small and indistinguishable
from effects produced by other media.”79
The hypothetical fake news statute asserts two compelling interests –
“preventing confused decision-making in voting choices and
safeguarding democratic self-governance during the voting process.” 80
The former rationale resides at the micro level – protecting people from
fake news that causes them to vote differently from how they would
have voted if they had not been exposed to fake news. The latter
justification, in contrast, exists at the macro level – stopping overall
election results in a democratic society from changing due to fake news.
There is little doubt, at least superficially, that these interests appear
compelling. After all, a fair democratic society requires voters to
understand policies and to make informed decisions. 81 As Alexander
Meiklejohn contended, the goal of free speech in a democratic society is
“the voting of wise decisions.”82 Borrowing Meiklejohn’s own words,

72. 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
73. Id. at 799 (emphasis added).
74. See generally R. George Wright, Electoral Lies and the Broader Problems of Strict Scrutiny,
64 FLA. L. REV. 759, 777 (2012) (identifying strict scrutiny as having “two prongs” and specifying the
first prong as requiring a “compelling government interest” and the second prong as requiring
“sufficiently narrow tailoring”).
75. Brown, 564 U.S. at 799 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803,
822 (2000)).
76. Id. See also United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012) (“There must be a direct
causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”).
77. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
78. Id. at 822.
79. Brown, 564 U.S. at 800-01.
80. Supra note 44.
81. Jennifer L. Hochschild, If Democracies Need Informed Voters, How Can They Thrive While
Expanding Enfranchisement?, 9 ELECTION L. J.: RULES, POL. & POL’Y 111, 111 (2010).
82. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 45, at 25.
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fake news seemingly contributes to the “mutilation of the thinking
process of the community”83 of voters. The overall outcome of an
election, one hopes, would not be swayed and determined by fake news.
Yet, strict scrutiny requires proving a “direct causal link” 84 to
demonstrate that fake news is, in fact, “an ‘actual problem’ in need of
solving.”85 In other words, the government must establish that fake
news truly causes vote-changing confusion (the micro-level harm) and
directly changes the outcome of elections (the macro-level harm).
Anecdotal evidence will not cut the constitutional mustard.86 As Justice
Scalia wrote in Brown, “ambiguous proof will not suffice.” 87
Fake news certainly is blamed for causing a few high-profile
incidents. Most notably, there was a shooting at a pizzeria in which a
man was more than a little confused, if not completely bamboozled, by
fake news. 88 Thus, it is clear some people believe fake news. There
simply is, however, no empirical proof of a direct causal link between
fake news and either confused decision-making in the voting process or
harm to democratic self-governance in terms of the outcome of an
election changing.
Proving a direct causal link, especially in the intangible realm of
decision-making, is extremely difficult. Many factors may influence a
voter’s state of mind and, ultimately, his or her voting decision. In brief,
teasing apart and separating variables that may lead to the decision of
how to vote is an exceedingly complex process. 89
For instance, a person who voted for Donald Trump might have read
and actually believed a fake news story relating to Trump or Hillary
Clinton, but the vote for Trump may have been based on a myriad of
additional variables. These variables might include a personal dislike of
Clinton, a disagreement with her positions on substantive issues, or a
83. Id. at 26.
84. Brown, 564 U.S. at 799.
85. Id. (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000)).
86. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000) (opining that “the
Government must present more than anecdote and supposition”).
87. Brown, 564 U.S. at 799-800.
88. See Cecilia Kang & Adam Goldman, Fake News Brought Real Guns in Washington Pizzeria
Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2016, at A1 (describing an incident in which a man who had been reading
“fake news articles about Comet Ping Pong” supposedly “harboring young children as sex slaves as part
of a child-abuse ring led by Hillary Clinton” went to the restaurant “to see the situation for himself” and,
in turn, “fired from an assault-like AR-15 rifle”).
89. See Blair Lehman et al., Confusion and Complex Learning During Interactions With
Computer Learning Environments, 15 INTERNET & HIGHER EDUC. 184, 184 (2012) (concluding that
“complex learning occurs when learners work towards comprehending difficult material, solve a
difficult problem, or make a difficult decision,” such as voting decisions, and contending that during
complex learning “there is a natural ebb and flow between positive and negative emotions, coinciding
with the struggles and successes that learners experience during effortful problems solving, reasoning
and comprehension”).
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disdain for all Democratic politicians. Conversely, other variables may
include a personal fondness of Trump, an agreement with his positions
on substantive issues, a loyalty to the Republican party,90 and so forth.
Now consider the impact of real news relevant to the 2016
presidential election. For instance, the decision of James Comey, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation – just eleven days before
the election – to reinvestigate Clinton’s private email server may have
caused people to vote for Trump. 91 Indeed, the New York Times
reported that Clinton directly “cast blame for her surprise election loss”
on Comey’s announcement.92 Alternatively, some Democrats attribute
the outcome of the election to computer hacking by Russia and the
subsequent release of emails from the Democratic National Committee
and from Clinton’s campaign chair.93
Imagine having to pick one variable – fake news, Comey, or Russia –
and then attempting to control for the other two, as well as controlling
for typically influential factors such as party identification, gender,
substantive issues, and interpersonal networks, to determine why people
voted the way they did. It is not easily said and even less easily done.
In a nutshell, it is far simpler to hurl verbal blame for why people
vote the way they do than to empirically prove what actually causes
them to do so. Direct causation is what strict scrutiny demands per
Brown and Alvarez. Fake news – although perhaps believed – does not
necessarily lead to either a changed or confused voting decision.
Dozens of other bits of information and factors swirl frenetically in any
election season that may cause a citizen to choose to vote for a particular
candidate. 94
Similarly, voters can be confused by many things other than and in
addition to fake news in deciding for whom to vote. They may be
influenced and befuddled by numerous outside factors, including the

90. See generally Gregory L. Hager & Jeffery C. Talbert, Look for the Party Label: Party
Influences on Voting in the U. S. House, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 75, 94 (2000) (“Our results suggest that
parties do influence member behavior beyond that predicted from their individual preference
structure.”).
91. See Michael S. Schmidt & Adam Goldman, President is Said to Ask Comey to Keep F.B.I.
Post, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2017, at A15 (“Mrs. Clinton and many Democrats blame Mr. Comey for her
defeat, and it is not clear whether she would have kept him on had she won.”).
92. Amy Chozick, Clinton Blames F.B.I. Director for Her Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2016, at
A1.
93. See Michael D. Shear & David E. Sanger, Putin Led Scheme to Aid Trump, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
7, 2017, at A1 (providing an overview of a report prepared by several U.S. intelligence agencies
regarding Russian hacking intended to influence the presidential election in Trump’s favor).
94. See Benjamin I. Page & Calvin C. Jones, Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party
Loyalties and the Vote, 73 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1071, 1087 (1973) (asserting that “researchers who rely
on single-equation techniques simply fail to reproduce faithfully the underlying complexity of the
electoral decision process”) (emphasis added).
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views of neighbors, friends, and relatives during interpersonal
conversations, the views of radio talk show hosts and television
personalities, advertisements for candidates on television, biased
reporting (which is not the same as fake news defined in this Article),
and conspiracy theories.
In addition to a dearth of empirical research proving that banning fake
news would promote the government’s dual interests, a recent study
indicates fake news may have had, if anything, a de minimis effect on
the 2016 presidential election.95 Economists from New York University
and Stanford found that fake news likely did not sway the U.S.
presidential election, despite the fact that it only needed to change the
votes of 0.73% of the voting-age population to do so.96 According to
the researchers,
data suggest that social media were not the most important source
of election news, and even the most widely circulated fake news
stories were seen by only a small fraction of Americans. For fake
news to have changed the outcome of the election, a single fake
news story would need to have convinced about 0.7 percent of
Clinton voters and non-voters who saw it to shift their votes to
Trump, a persuasion rate equivalent to seeing 36 television
campaign ads.97
Furthermore, a December 2016 Pew Research Center survey found an
overwhelming majority of Americans expressed confidence in their
ability to detect fake news, with about four out of ten (39%) feeling very
confident they could recognize fabricated news and another 45% being
somewhat confident. 98 In other words, 84% of those surveyed were
either somewhat or very confident they would not be fooled by fake
news. This too suggests fake news is not “an actual problem.” 99
Moreover, scant data exist on any aspect of fake news, much less
whether it causes voters to change their ballots. A January 2017
analysis in Columbia Journalism Review posits that “[w]e know little
about the amount of fake news an average citizen consumes, or how it
fits into their overall news diet. In fact, we don’t know much about the

95. Working Paper No. 23089, Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake
News in the 2016 Election, NAT’ L BUREAU ECON. RES. (Jan. 2017) (on file with author).
96. Id. at 20.
97. Id. at 22.
98. Michael Barthel et al., Many Americans Believe Fake News is Sowing Confusion, PEW RES.
CTR., Dec. 15, 2016, http://www.journalism.org/2016/12/15/many-americans-believe-fake-news-issowing-confusion.
99. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000).
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fake news audience, period.”100 The same analysis suggests that fake
news might not be a problem at all. Why? First, it found “the fake news
audience is tiny compared to the real news audience – about ten times
smaller on average.”101 Second, the study underscores “the fact that the
fake news audience is small and highly likely to also visit real news sites
may come as a relief to those who fear this audience lives in a separate,
distorted reality.”102
Ultimately, it is much easier to claim that fake news influences voters
than it is, under strict scrutiny, to prove a direct causal link between fake
news and the harm it causes either to individual voting decisions or to
overall election outcomes. Thus, the government would find it
extraordinarily challenging to prove that the two interests were
compelling enough to justify a hypothetical law criminalizing the
knowing creation and dissemination of fake news about matters of
public concern.
As Justice Anthony Kennedy explained in announcing the Court’s
judgment in Alvarez, “[t]here must be a direct causal link between the
restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”103 There is,
however, no direct causal evidence revealing that fake news prompts
individuals to vote differently than they would have without fake news
or that fake news causes overall election outcomes to change. Put more
bluntly, no evidence demonstrates fake news is “an actual problem” 104
when it comes to voters’ decisions.
More so, even if one could prove that some voters did in fact change
their decisions due to fake news, it would not justify government
regulation if the real-world effect was “small and indistinguishable from
effects produced by other media.” 105 In other words, the government
would need to somehow demonstrate that the effect of fake news in
influencing voter decisions was larger than, and distinguishable from,
the impact of innumerable messages affecting voter decisions.
Assuming for the sake of argument that a direct causal link between
fake news and voting decisions was demonstrated and that the impact
carried practical significance, this still would not end the strict scrutiny
inquiry. Specifically, the second prong of the test requires that a statute
be narrowly tailored.

100. Jacob L. Nelson, Is ‘Fake News’ a Fake Problem?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan. 31,
2017, https://www.cjr.org/analysis/fake-news-facebook-audience-drudge-breitbart-study.php.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012).
104. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 822.
105. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 800-01 (2011).
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As defined in 2014 by the majority in McCullen v. Coakley, 106 strict
scrutiny’s narrow-tailoring prong mandates that lawmakers use “the
least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.” 107 Put
differently, a content-based law will not pass constitutional muster if a
compelling interest “can be accomplished by a less restrictive
alternative.”108 In fact, as the Court noted, “[w]hen a plausible, less
restrictive alternative is offered to a content-based speech restriction, it
is the Government’s obligation to prove that the alternative will be
ineffective to achieve its goals.”109 The burden thus shifts to the
government to refute the effectiveness of a plausible, less restrictive
method of serving a compelling interest.
As applied to this Article’s hypothetical statute, the government
would need to prove the inefficacy of at least three plausible, less
speech-restrictive ways of preventing people from being confused by
fake news such that they vote differently because of it. Those three
alternatives are: (1) counterspeech, (2) education, and (3) selfregulation.
The doctrine of counterspeech is grounded in Justice Louis
Brandeis’s observation ninety years ago that “if there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence.”110 The doctrine’s premise is “that ‘bad speech’ can
be effectively countered or cured with more speech.” 111
Dean Rodney Smolla points out that Justice Kennedy’s plurality
opinion in Alvarez “emphasized the importance of counterspeech in the
balance, and the requirement that the government show that
counterspeech will not work to vindicate its interests.”112 Professor
Howard Wasserman concurs, noting that Kennedy’s strict scrutiny
analysis emphasized that “any confusion from false statements could be
overcome by truthful counterspeech as the remedy for false speech.” 113
This is particularly significant because Alvarez – in line with the
hypothetical statute’s definition of fake news 114 – involved a material,

106. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
107. Id. at 2530 (emphasis added).
108. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 814.
109. Id. at 816.
110. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
111. Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Counterspeech 2000: A New Look at the Old Remedy for
“Bad” Speech, 2000 BYU L. REV. 553, 554 (2000).
112. Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of Free Speech
Doctrine and Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 499,
515 (2012).
113. Howard M. Wasserman, Holmes and Brennan, 67 ALA. L. REV. 797, 824 (2016).
114. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (providing the hypothetical statute’s definition
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factual assertion that was empirically verifiable as false. Specifically,
Xavier Alvarez falsely claimed to possess the Congressional Medal of
Honor.115 He was, in turn, “indicted under the Stolen Valor Act for
lying about the Congressional Medal of Honor.”116
In declaring the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional under what he
called “exacting First Amendment scrutiny,” 117 Kennedy concluded that
“[t]he Government has not shown, and cannot show, why counterspeech
would not suffice to achieve its interest. The facts of this case indicate
that the dynamics of free speech, of counterspeech, of refutation, can
overcome the lie.”118 With concision and eloquence, Kennedy explained
that “the remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. This is the
ordinary course in a free society. The response to the unreasoned is the
rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straight-out lie, the
simple truth.”119 Intimating that the government simply has no role to
play as truth arbiter, Kennedy added that “only a weak society needs
government protection or intervention before it pursues its resolve to
preserve the truth. Truth needs neither handcuffs nor a badge for its
vindication.”120
As applied to fake news, counterspeech easily takes the form of nongovernmental fact-checking organizations and mainstream news media
outlets that investigate and, in turn, rebut fake news spewed by others. 121
The Poynter Institute for Media Studies, for example, coordinates the
International Fact-Checking Network.122 Websites such as Snopes 123
and PolitiFact124 are devoted to rigorous verification of facts. These
sites, in other words, are themselves counterspeech ventures.
They also represent the type of counterspeech Justice Kennedy valued
and praised in Alvarez. There, he pointed out that “private individuals
have already created databases”125 listing the names of actual
of fake news).
115. United States v. Alvarez, 132 U.S. 2537, 2542 (2012).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2546.
118. Id. at 2549.
119. Id. at 2550.
120. Id. at 2550-51.
121. See LUCAS GRAVES, DECIDING WHAT’S TRUE: THE RISE OF POLITICAL F ACT -CHECKING IN
AMERICAN JOURNALISM (2016) (providing an up-to-date account on fact-checking journalism); Brendan
Nyhan & Jason Reifler, The Effect of Fact-Checking on Elites: A Field Experiment on U.S. State
Legislators, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 628 (2015) (studying the effects of fact-checking on deterring
politicians from making questionable statements and assertions).
122. About the International Fact-Checking Network, http://www.poynter.org/about-theinternational-fact-checking-network.
123. Snopes, http://www.snopes.com.
124. PolitiFact, http://www.politifact.com.
125. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

17

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 3

116

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

Congressional Medal of Honor recipients and that “at least one database
of past winners is online and fully searchable,” 126 thus countering
fabulists such as Xavier Alvarez. Kennedy even suggested the
government could create such a database that would constitute “one less
speech-restrictive means by which the Government could likely protect
the integrity of the military awards system.” 127
In addition to counterspeech, a second plausible and less restrictive
remedy for fake news is education. For example, in terms of educating
the public about fake news, the Washington Post offers readers a guide
for how to detect it. 128 National Public Radio provides a similar online
resource.129
Perhaps more importantly, state and local governments can adopt
improved media literacy programs in public schools. In fact, California
lawmakers introduced legislation in January 2017130 designed to do
exactly that in light of fake-news fears.131 Assembly Bill 155 calls on
the California’s Instructional Quality Commission to generate “revised
curriculum standards and frameworks for English language arts,
mathematics, history-social science, and science that incorporate civic
online reasoning.”132 The bill defines “civic online reasoning” as “the
ability to judge the credibility and quality of information found on
Internet Web sites, including social media.” 133 The bill’s sponsor,
Assemblyman Jimmy Gomez, argues it is needed because “[w]hen fake
news is repeated, it becomes difficult for the public to discern what’s
real. These attempts to mislead readers pose a direct threat to our
democracy.”134
In addition to counterspeech and education, a third plausible and less
speech-restrictive remedy for fake news is voluntary self-regulation by
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Glenn Kessler, The Fact Checker’s Guide for Detecting Fake News, WASH. P OST, Nov. 22,
2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/11/22/the-fact-checkers-guide-fordetecting-fake-news/?utm_term=.c21972a0261c.
129. Wynne Davis, Fake or Real? How to Self-Check the News and Get the Facts, NAT’L P UB.
RADIO, Dec. 5, 2016, http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/12/05/503581220/fake-orreal-how-to-self-check-the-news-and-get-the-facts.
130. A.B. 155, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
131. See Lindsey Bever, If State Lawmakers Have Their Way, California Schoolchildren May be
Taught
How
to
Spot
‘Fake
News,’
WASH.
POST,
Jan.
12,
2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/12/if-state-lawmakers-have-their-waycalifornia-schoolchildren-may-be-taught-how-to-spot-fake-news (describing the legislation).
132. A.B. 155, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (emphasis added).
133. Id.
134. Melanie Mason, Fake News 101? Lawmakers Want California Schools to Teach Students
How to Evaluate What They Read on the Web, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2017,
http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-los-angeles-assemblymanproposes-bill-1484182108-htmlstory.html.
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private entities. Some of these approaches already are underway to
tackle fake news frets. For instance, the New York Times reported in
December 2016 that Facebook was conducting
a series of experiments to limit misinformation on its site. The
tests include making it easier for its 1.8 billion members to report
fake news, and creating partnerships with outside fact-checking
organizations to help it indicate when articles are false. The
company is also changing some advertising practices to stop
purveyors of fake news from profiting from it. 135
In a similar vein, Justice Scalia in Brown lauded the Entertainment
Software Rating Board’s (ESRB) self-regulatory system for evaluating
video games’ suitability for minors as a prime example of a less
restrictive method for addressing a supposed problem. 136 “This system
does much to ensure that minors cannot purchase seriously violent
games on their own, and that parents who care about the matter can
readily evaluate the games their children bring home,” Scalia
reasoned. 137 In other words, the ESRB’s ratings combine aspects of
both education and self-regulation.
Ultimately, it is decidedly unlikely that a statute criminalizing the
knowing creation and dissemination of fake news, as defined in this
Article, 138 would ever survive strict scrutiny. Even if a compelling
interest were substantiated in the face of the demanding direct causal
link standard, there are multiple means of combatting fake news that are
far less restrictive of speech than criminalizing it. With this assessment
in mind, the Article next turns to an underinclusivity analysis of the
hypothetical statute.
B.

Underinclusiveness

Can a statute do too little to cure problems allegedly caused by speech
and thus be struck down for failing to advance a compelling interest?
The answer is yes – sometimes – and the doctrine involved is
underinclusivity.139 Although Chief Justice John Roberts recently wrote
135. Mike Isaac, Facebook Moves to Limit Tide of Fake News on Its Network, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2016, at B1. See also Jessica Guynn, Facebook Takes Serious Aim at Fake News, USA TODAY,
Dec. 16, 2016, at B1 (reporting that “[n]ews articles flagged by [Facebook] users will be sent to thirdparty fact-checking organizations that are part of Poynter’s International Fact Checking Network”).
136. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 803 (2011).
137. Id.
138. See supra notes 30-33 (providing the hypothetical statute’s definition of fake news).
139. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1668 (2015) (asserting that while it is
“somewhat counterintuitive to argue that a law violates the First Amendment by abridging too little
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that “the First Amendment imposes no freestanding ‘underinclusiveness
limitation,’”140 Professor Mark Cordes dubs underinclusivity “an area of
frequent concern for the Supreme Court.”141
Indeed, Professor Matthew Bunker observes that the Court’s
underinclusivity standard is integral to strict scrutiny’s narrow-tailoring
inquiry.142 Bunker suggests this initially seems counterintuitive, 143 as
narrow tailoring examines whether a law uses the least restrictive means
of achieving a compelling interest, 144 while underinclusivity conversely
considers if a statute is “not broad enough.” 145 In brief, lawmakers tread
a tightrope: a statute cannot regulate too much speech per narrow
tailoring, yet it also cannot regulate too little speech per
underinclusivity.
In Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar,146 Chief Justice Roberts explained
that a statute’s “[u]nderinclusivity creates a First Amendment concern
when the State regulates one aspect of a problem while declining to
regulate a different aspect of the problem that affects its stated interest in
a comparable way.”147 Put differently by Harvard Professor Richard
Fallon, underinclusivity holds that “[a] statute will not survive strict
scrutiny if it fails to regulate activities that pose substantially the same
threats to the government’s purportedly compelling interest as the
conduct that the government prohibits.”148
In Williams-Yulee, Roberts explained that underinclusivity may
indicate two problems.149 First, the government may be unjustly
promoting one viewpoint over another, instead of addressing a broader
interest.150 Second, a regulation riddled with multiple exemptions and
loopholes may fail to advance a compelling interest. 151 Federal
appellate court judge Harry Edwards encapsulated these dual concerns
speech,” a statute’s underinclusiveness can “reveal that a law does not actually advance a compelling
interest. For example, a State’s decision to prohibit newspapers, but not electronic media, from
releasing the names of juvenile defendants suggested that the law did not advance its stated purpose of
protecting youth privacy”) (emphasis in original).
140. Id. (quoting R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 387 (1992)).
141. Mark Cordes, Sign Regulation After Ladue: Examining the Evolving Limits of First
Amendment Protection, 74 NEB. L. REV. 36, 69 (1995).
142. Matthew D. Bunker & Emily Erickson, The Jurisprudence of Precision: Contrast Space and
Narrow Tailoring in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 259, 264 n.16 (2001).
143. Id.
144. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014). See supra notes 106-109 and
accompanying text (addressing the meaning of narrow tailoring within strict scrutiny).
145. Bunker & Erickson, supra note 142, at 264 n.16.
146. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
147. Id. at 1670 (emphasis omitted).
148. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV . 1267, 1327 (2007).
149. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1668-69.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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in a 1995 article, remarking that courts
frequently employ an underinclusiveness inquiry to determine
whether a given regulation satisfactorily serves the interest that the
state purports to advance.
If a speech restriction leaves
unregulated significant alternative sources of the harm sought to be
remedied, a court will reason that the underinclusiveness either
belies the state’s avowed objective, or establishes that, in practice,
the regulation will not adequately serve the state’s putatively
compelling interest.152
Consider the scenario in City of Ladue v. Gilleo:153 the Supreme
Court struck down an ordinance banning homeowners from displaying
signs on their property while simultaneously exempting ten other
varieties of signs from its strictures. 154 The Court reasoned that the
numerous exemptions indicated Ladue was not truly worried about its
three alleged interests 155 – preserving beauty, maintaining property
values, and mitigating traffic hazards. 156 The outcome in Gilleo
confirms Professor William Lee’s perspicacious observation that, per
the underinclusivity doctrine, “what a law excludes is a critical part of
determining whether a law is precisely tailored.” 157
Two newer Supreme Court decisions illustrate that regulating too
little speech may render a statute fatally underinclusive. In 2015, the
Court in Reed v. Town of Gilbert158 held that a sign ordinance was
“hopelessly underinclusive”159 in serving alleged interests in “preserving
the Town’s aesthetic appeal and traffic safety.”160 Specifically, the
Town of Gilbert’s ordinance generally banned outdoor signs within its

152. Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 NW. U. L.
REV. 1487, 1530-31 (1995) (citations omitted).
153. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
154. See id. at 46 (“The ordinance prohibits all signs except those that fall within 1 of 10
exemptions.”).
155. See id. at 52 (“Exemptions from an otherwise legitimate regulation of a medium of speech
may be noteworthy for a reason quite apart from the risks of viewpoint and content discrimination: They
may diminish the credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting speech in the first place.”).
156. See id. at 47 (noting that Ladue, in the ordinance’s declaration of findings, was concerned
that an unlimited number of signs would “create ugliness, visual blight and clutter, tarnish the natural
beauty of the landscape as well as the residential and commercial architecture, impair property values,
substantially impinge upon the privacy and special ambience of the community, and may cause safety
and traffic hazards to motorists, pedestrians, and children”).
157. William E. Lee, The First Amendment Doctrine of Underbreadth, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 637,
68788 (1993) (emphasis added).
158. 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
159. Id. at 2231.
160. Id.
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town limits but carved out a whopping twenty-three exemptions.161
As for the town’s aesthetics rationale, Justice Clarence Thomas
explained for the Court that the Town of Gilbert “cannot claim that
placing strict limits on temporary directional signs is necessary to
beautify the Town while at the same time allowing unlimited numbers
of other types of signs that create the same problem.” 162 Turning to the
municipality’s safety interest, Thomas opined that the Town of Gilbert
failed to demonstrate
that limiting temporary directional signs is necessary to eliminate
threats to traffic safety, but that limiting other types of signs is not.
The Town has offered no reason to believe that directional signs
pose a greater threat to safety than do ideological or political signs.
If anything, a sharply worded ideological sign seems more likely to
distract a driver than a sign directing the public to a nearby church
meeting. 163
In its 2011 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association
decision, 164 the Court held that a California statute banning minors from
renting and purchasing violent video games was profoundly
underinclusive in two respects. First, citing Gilleo for support,165 Justice
Antonin Scalia explained for the majority that California failed “to
restrict Saturday morning cartoons, the sale of games rated for young
children, or the distribution of pictures of guns. The consequence is that
its regulation is wildly underinclusive when judged against its asserted
justification, which in our view is alone enough to defeat it.”166 Second,
California’s statute carved out an exemption allowing parents and
guardians to purchase violent games on behalf of minors. 167 Here,
Scalia reasoned:
The California Legislature is perfectly willing to leave this
dangerous, mind-altering material in the hands of children so long
as one parent (or even an aunt or uncle) says it’s OK. And there
are not even any requirements as to how this parental or avuncular
relationship is to be verified; apparently the child’s or putative
parent’s, aunt’s, or uncle’s say-so suffices. That is not how one

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 2224.
Id. at 2231.
Id. at 2232.
564 U.S. 786 (2011).
Id. at 802
Id. at 801-02 (emphasis added).
Id. at 802.
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addresses a serious social problem. 168
Taking into account the above primer on underinclusivity, a critical
issue is whether this Article’s hypothetical statute banning the knowing
creation and dissemination of fake news about matters of public concern
is terminally underinclusive. Initially, it is important to recall that the
statute’s two asserted interests are “preventing confused decisionmaking in voting choices and safeguarding democratic self-governance
during the voting process.”169 Fake news, in turn, is defined as “articles
that suggest, by both their appearance and content, the conveyance of
real news, but also knowingly include at least one material factual
assertion that is empirically verifiable as false and that is not otherwise
protected by the fair report privilege.” 170
The primary underinclusiveness problem here is that many
unregulated types of speech – some varieties were described earlier 171 –
may cause confusion and detrimentally affect voting choices in ways
substantially comparable to that of fake news. 172 For example, consider
rhetorical hyperbole173 directly spewed by politicians during speeches,
rallies, debates, and press conferences. Such potentially influential yet
logically cloudy expression is left unscathed by the hypothetical statute,
which applies only to articles appearing to be real news.
Additionally, biased and opinionated journalistic coverage of
campaigns and candidates – although not factually false – could result in
voter confusion. It too goes untouched by the statute, which defines
fake news as involving a material and false factual assertion. 174 In other
words, journalistic expressions of opinion and slanted coverage may
confuse voters equally as much as verifiably false factual assertions, yet
the former falls beyond the ambit of the hypothetical statute.

168. Id.
169. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (quoting this portion of the text that appears earlier
in this article that corresponds with footnote 44).
170. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (quoting this portion of the text that appears
earlier in this article that corresponds with footnotes 30 through 33).
171. Supra Part I, Section A.
172. The question of comparability of impact is important, as Chief Justice Roberts wrote in
Williams-Yulee that “[u]nderinclusivity creates a First Amendment concern when the State regulates one
aspect of a problem while declining to regulate a different aspect of the problem that affects its stated
interest in a comparable way.” Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1670 (2015) (emphasis in
original).
173. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (safeguarding from libel suits
“rhetorical hyperbole,” and noting that such speech “has traditionally added much to the discourse of
our Nation”).
174. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (providing the hypothetical statute’s definition
of fake news”).
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Furthermore, consider a popular televangelist who instructs tens of
thousands of faithful followers during weekly TV sermons and during
daily posts on Twitter not to vote for Candidate X because, according to
the televangelist, Candidate X wants to confiscate their guns in
contravention of the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 175
The statute does not restrict the televangelist’s speech, even if the
assertions are false, because the statute addresses only “articles that
suggest, by both their appearance and content, the conveyance of real
news.”176 The televangelist’s statements are communicated in sermons
and Twitter posts, not in articles purporting to be real news.
Additionally, imagine that while speaking on the senate floor, a
lawmaker falsely accuses another senator of having an extramarital
affair – a charge streamed live on C-SPAN. This too goes unchecked
because the statute only reaches news articles. 177 Moreover, even if a
journalist accurately reports the senator’s false allegations in a later
news article, neither the journalist nor the news outlet can be punished
because the statute’s definition of fake news exempts falsities that would
otherwise be shielded from libel suits under the fair report privilege. 178
Thus, while the accusations levied by both the televangelist and the
senator are statements that can be empirically proven as false, they
evade the hypothetical statute’s reach and thus float free to confuse,
bother, and bewilder voters.179
Ultimately, whenever and wherever confusion affects balloting, it is
likely the consequence of many unregulated variables – ones
comparable to, if not more powerful than, fake news in spawning
confusion. Furthermore, and perhaps of even greater significance, there
175. See U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). The Second
Amendment has been incorporated by the Supreme Court to apply to state and local government entities
and officials through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (holding “that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Second Amendment right” as recognized by the Court in District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008), and specifying that “[i]n Heller, we held that the Second Amendment protects the
right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense”).
176. Supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
177. Supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing this exemption from the statute’s
definition of fake news and the rationale for carving out the exemption); see also KENT R. MIDDLETON
& WILLIAM E. LEE, THE LAW OF P UBLIC COMMUNICATION 158 (9th ed. 2014) (“A qualified privilege
protects journalists who report defamatory comments made in official proceedings as long as the stories
are fair and accurate.”); ROBERT TRAGER ET AL., THE LAW OF JOURNALISM AND MASS
COMMUNICATION 197 (6th ed. 2018) (noting that to fit within this privilege, “[t]he news report must
fairly and accurately reflect what is in the public record or what was said during the official
proceeding,” and adding that “[t]he source of the statement should be clearly noted in the news report”).
179. Cf. FRANK SINATRA, Bewitched, on NOTHING BUT THE BEST (Reprise Records 2008)
(singing, in just one of many cover versions of the song over the decades, “I’m wild again, beguiled
again, a whimpering, simpering child again, bewitched, bothered and bewildered – am I”).
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are far vaster and more challenging social and cultural phenomena –
systemic variables at a macro level – that likely contribute to voter
confusion, but go unchecked by the statute. These include (1) a lack of
digital media literacy, news literacy and rudimentary civic education
among some people; (2) the replacement of traditional news sources –
ones that typically follow ethical tenets of responsible journalism 180 –
with information delivered via social media platforms that fail to adhere
to such standards; and (3) the inability or unwillingness of politicians to
truthfully communicate with their constituents.
As a result, censorship of fake news, as defined in this article, fails to
make a dent or dimple on much larger problems of “preventing confused
decision-making in voting choices and safeguarding democratic selfgovernance during the voting process.” 181 This Article’s hypothetical
statute thus would almost certainly be declared unconstitutional for its
underinclusivity. It simply does too little, failing to directly and
materially advance its dual interests.
With this doctrinal analysis of both strict scrutiny and
underinclusiveness complete, the Article now addresses two venerable
theories of free speech to consider if they would safeguard fake news
from government censorship.
II. A FREE SPEECH THEORY PERSPECTIVE ON CENSORING F AKE NEWS:
WHY THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS AND DEMOCRATIC SELF-GOVERNANCE
THEORIES FAIL TO PROTECT F AKE NEWS FROM CENSORSHIP
This Part has two sections. Initially, Section A analyzes support – or
lack thereof – for protecting fake news against government censorship
under the marketplace of ideas theory. Section B then considers the
same issue, but from the perspective of Alexander Meiklejohn’s theory
of democratic self-governance.
A.

The Marketplace of Ideas

First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla crowns the marketplace of
ideas as “perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech
tradition.”182 Similarly, Professor Matthew Bunker dubs it “one of the
most powerful images of free speech, both for legal thinkers and for

180. Cf. AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI
THREATEN A FREE PRESS 2 (2015) (asserting that courts traditionally granted mainstream news
organizations deference under the First Amendment based on an assumption “that journalists could be
trusted to regulate themselves through professional norms and standards”).
181. Supra note 44.
182. S MOLLA, supra note 3 at 6.
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laypersons.”183
Indeed, a content analysis of opinions published twenty-one years ago
reveals that the marketplace of ideas is “the model most called upon by
the U.S. Supreme Court in the resolution of free-expression cases.”184
Today, it remains often invoked by the Court. 185
The foundational premises of this highly influential, albeit often
criticized, 186 theory are twofold. The first is that protecting open,
uninhibited exchanges of ideas promotes truth discovery. 187 The second
premise is that even if absolute truth is never established or agreed
upon, 188 the process itself – the testing and confronting of contemporary
conceptions of truth – must be privileged. 189 In brief, the marketplace
theory is as much about process (challenging ideas) as it is about

183. MATTHEW D. B UNKER, CRITIQUING F REE S PEECH : F IRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND
CHALLENGE OF I NTERDISCIPLINARITY 2 (2001).
184. W. Wat Hopkins, The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73 J OURNALISM &
MASS COMM. Q. 40, 47 (1996).
185. See, e.g., Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245-46
(2015) (asserting that “government statements (and government actions and programs that take the form
of speech) do not normally trigger the First Amendment rules designed to protect the marketplace of
ideas”); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring) (conceding
“that, whenever government disfavors one kind of speech, it places that speech at a disadvantage,
potentially interfering with the free marketplace of ideas”); McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529
(2014) (“In light of the First Amendment’s purpose ‘to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail,’ . . . this aspect of traditional public fora is a virtue, not a vice.”)
(quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)); Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310, 335 (2010) (asserting that when Federal Election Commission advisory opinions “prohibit
speech, ‘[m]any persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of
vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected
speech – harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas.’”) (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)).
186. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 831
(2008) (“For all of its power, the marketplace of ideas metaphor also has explanatory weaknesses and
normative difficulties, almost all of which track the shortcomings of its idealized view of an uninhibited,
costless, and perfectly efficient free market.”); Lyrissa Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience
as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 799, 826 (2010) (“According to critics, the
marketplace of ideas cannot function because a few powerful voices drown out all others. The resulting
lack of diversity in public discourse deprives citizens of the information they need to make rational
decisions and denies them their right to participate in policy formation.”).
187. See Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 998 (2003) (“The marketplace of ideas locates the value of free speech in
finding the truth, and it makes the market the arbiter of truth or falsity.”).
188. Indeed, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. who, as described later, is most closely associated
with the marketplace of ideas theory in First Amendment jurisprudence, “displayed an instinctive
aversion to assertions of ‘absolute’ truth.” Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004
S UP. CT. REV. 1, 14 (2004).
189. See Enrique Armijo, The “Ample Alternative Channels” Flaw in First Amendment Doctrine,
73 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1657, 1696-98 (2016) (noting that “[m]arketplace theory defines the First
Amendment’s primary function as facilitating a process by which truth can be reached,” and adding that
“[a] process-based definition of marketplace theory predominates in First Amendment scholarship”)
(emphasis added).
THE
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product (the truth).
As this Article’s epigraph reveals, the marketplace of ideas model,
with its quest-for-truth telos, 190 originates in John Milton’s 1644
Areopagitica.191 John Stuart Mill then elaborated on the marketplace of
ideas model over 200 years later in On Liberty.192 As Professor Kent
Greenawalt explains, the contention “that speech promotes the discovery
of truth”193 forms “the core of John Stuart Mill’s defense of freedom of
speech in On Liberty.”194
Importantly for this Article, Mill emphasized protecting opinions, not
empirically disprovable falsehoods. Specifically, On Liberty’s chapter
“Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion” is devoted to what Mill
termed “the subject of freedom of opinion.”195 He directed his analysis
against “the mischief of denying a hearing to opinions.” 196 Perhaps
more famously, Mill asserted that
the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it
is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than
those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the
opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what
is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error. 197
As summarized by Professor Frederick Schauer, “Mill focuses our
attention on the possibility that truth may lie in the suppressed
opinion.”198 In a nutshell, Mill’s ideal marketplace shunned the stifling
of opinions, not factual falsehoods.
Against this Millian philosophical backdrop, the marketplace theory
was imported into First Amendment law by Justice Oliver Wendell

190. See F REDERICK S CHAUER, F REE S PEECH : A P HILOSOPHICAL I NQUIRY 15 (1982)
(“Milton’s Areopagitica, the earliest comprehensive defence of freedom of speech, is based substantially
on the premise that the absence of government restrictions on publishing (particularly the absence of
licensing) will enable society to locate truth and reject error.”).
191. Supra notes 1-2.
192. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859).
See Nicholas A. Primrose, Has Society Become Tolerant of Further Infringement on First Amendment
Rights?, 19 BARRY L. REV . 313, 333, n.132 (2013) (“The ‘marketplace of ideas’ was originally
developed in the book On Liberty by John Stuart Mill.”).
193. Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM . L. REV . 119, 130 (1989).
194. Id.
195. MILL, supra note 191, at 116.
196. Id. at 83.
197. Id. at 76.
198. SCHAUER, supra note 189, at 24 (emphasis added).
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Holmes, Jr.,199 nearly 100 years ago in Abrams v. United States.200
Although Professor Vincent Blasi calls Holmes’ holding an “irreverent
attitude toward the concept of truth,” 201 the justice paved the path for the
marketplace theory in Abrams, opining in dissent that
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas – that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. 202
Consistent with Mill’s emphasis on safeguarding opinions, Holmes’s
above-quoted language focuses on protecting “ideas”203 and
“thought[s],”204 not disprovable facts. The impact of his message on
First Amendment jurisprudence is profound. As Professor Joseph
Blocher notes, “[n]ever before or since has a Justice conceived a
metaphor that has done so much to change the way that courts, lawyers,
and the public understand an entire area of constitutional law.”205
The U.S. Supreme Court in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell206 embraced
both the marketplace of ideas and its emphasis on protecting opinions,
rather than false facts. Delivering the Court’s decision, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist explained that “[f]alse statements of fact are
particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of
the marketplace of ideas.”207 Indeed, this important fact-versus-opinion
dichotomy builds from the Court’s 1974 observation in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.208 that
[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its

199. See Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 3
(1984) (writing that although the marketplace of ideas’ “classic image of competing ideas and robust
debate dates back to English philosophers John Milton and John Stuart Mill, Justice Holmes first
introduced the concept into American jurisprudence in his 1919 dissent to Abrams v. United States”).
200. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
201. Blasi, supra note 187, at 15.
202. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Blocher, supra note 185, at 824-825.
206. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
207. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
208. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact.209
Similar, and consistent with this article’s narrow definition of
proscribable fake news as limited to knowingly false factual
statements, 210 is the Supreme Court’s analysis in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.211 In Sullivan, the Court suggested that a well-functioning idea
marketplace – one both embracing “the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”212 and “‘gathered
out of a multitude of tongues’” 213 – did not protect, per actual malice, a
defamatory factual assertion published “with knowledge that it was
false.”214 More recently, Justice Stephen Breyer reasoned in United
States v. Alvarez215 that “false factual statements are less likely than are
true factual statements to make a valuable contribution to the
marketplace of ideas.”216
Ultimately, while the marketplace theory certainly provides strong
support for protecting opinions and arguments on topics involving
“unprovable normative judgments,”217 such as political policies and
social morality, it “provides a much weaker footing for protecting
expression that can be readily disproved.” 218 As Professor Steven Gey
powerfully argued:
If the determination of truth is the objective of the entire
marketplace mechanism, there is no point in permitting the further
dissemination of proven falsehoods. Indeed, disseminating
falsehoods directly undermines the purpose of having a
marketplace in the first place.
The only purpose of the
marketplace of ideas is to advance human understanding about the
nature of the world and the best way to live within it; it directly
contravenes that purpose if the marketplace is used to keep human
society mired in socially dysfunctional misunderstandings about

209. Id. at 339- – 40.
210. See supra notes 30 – 33 and accompanying text (providing the hypothetical statute’s
definition of fake news in the text that corresponds to these footnotes).
211. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
212. Id. at 270.
213. Id. (quoting United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (D.C. S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
214. Id. at 280.
215. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
216. Id. at 2552 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
217. Gey, supra note 48, at 9.
218. Id.
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the nature of the world and its history. 219
In brief, the marketplace of ideas theory does not support protecting
fake news, as defined in this article. Disseminating fake news does not
foster the type of rational debate or discussion220 that moves toward an
ever closer truth or, in the words of First Amendment scholar Lee
Bollinger, toward “as close an approximation of the truth as we can.” 221
If, as Yale Law School Dean Robert Post notes, “the search for truth
presupposes rational deliberation,” 222 then fake news must be driven
from the marketplace simply because it conflicts, by its very nature,
with rational deliberation. William Williams explains this via an
analogy:
Deliberately false statements were never envisioned as a useful
component of this marketplace. They are analogous to counterfeit
money in the physical marketplace: both equally worthless, yet
both potentially very harmful. In the same way that counterfeit
money is properly excluded from the physical marketplace, so too
is deliberately false speech properly excluded from the marketplace
of ideas.223
The bottom line is that marketplace theory does not support
protecting fake news from government censorship.
Might the
philosophy of democratic self-governance that is closely associated with
Alexander Meiklejohn provide a better rationale for safeguarding it?
The next section considers that question.
B.

Democratic Self-Governance

As with the marketplace of ideas, democratic self-governance is a
highly influential free speech theory. 224 Robert Post, for example,
219. Id.
220. As Professor Frederick Schauer observes, a well-functioning marketplace of ideas is
dependent on “rational thinking.” S CHAUER, supra note 189, at 15.
221. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 45 (1986).
222. Robert C. Post, Community and the First Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 480 (1997).
223. William A. Williams, A Necessary Compromise: Protecting Electoral Integrity Through the
Regulation of False Campaign Speech, 52 S.D. L. REV. 321, 350-51 (2007).
224. Eugene Volokh, Response: In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a
Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97 VA. L. REV. 595, 595 (2011) (writing that “a broad vision of
democratic self-government is one important justification for free speech”). Although this article
concentrates on the marketplace of ideas and democratic self-governance theories of free speech, there
are numerous other rationales supporting free expression. See Clay Calvert, The Voyeurism Value in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 273, 274 (1999) (“The freedoms of
speech and press, for example, are said to promote and to protect discovery of truth, democratic self-
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deems it one of three “major candidates” – along with knowledge
creation and individual autonomy – for best embodying key values
safeguarded by the First Amendment. 225 He adds that when it comes to
judicial rulings affecting free expression, “the value of democratic selfgovernance is the most powerful explanation of the general pattern of
First Amendment decisions . . . and . . . the only value that can
convincingly account for the specific set of decisions protecting the
abusive, outrageous and indecent speech.” 226
Although the theory certainly is not without criticism, 227 Post asserts
that Alexander Meiklejohn228 provided “an especially clear revelation of
the theory’s essential constitutional structure.”229 Indeed, Professor
Richard Epstein dubs Meiklejohn “the father of modern First
Amendment theory,”230 while Professor Steven Smith anoints him “a
seminal modern free speech theorist.”231
Professor Joseph Russomanno contends232 that such accolades are
largely due to Meiklejohn’s powerful influence on Justice William
Brennan’s opinion for the Supreme Court in the defamation case of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.233 As Professor Lucas Powe puts it, the
Court’s Sullivan decision “combined the insights of the philosopher
governance, self-realization, dissent, tolerance, and honest government.”) (citations omitted).
225. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 478 (2011).
226. Robert C. Post, Reply to Bender, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 495, 495 (1997).
227. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L.
REV. 1053, 1055-59 (2016) (offering three criticisms of Meiklejohn’s conception of democratic selfgovernance theory); Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic
Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 291
(1991) (“The more important fallacy . . . is Meiklejohn’s failure to recognize the substantial differences
between a town meeting and the realities of modern life.”); Martin H. Redish & Abbie Marie Mollen,
Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the
Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1303, 1313 (2009) (observing that some scholars “have
questioned Meiklejohn’s analogy to the New England town meeting as a metaphor for what speech
regulations the First Amendment does not prohibit,” while others have “suggested that Meiklejohn was
blinded by a rather myopic understanding of the kinds of speech relevant to democratic
decisionmaking”).
228. See Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1993) [hereinafter Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake] (asserting
that “Meiklejohn anchors the First Amendment firmly to the value of self-government”).
229. Id.
230. Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782, 782
(1986).
231. Steven D. Smith, Believing Persons, Personal Believings: The Neglected Center of the First
Amendment, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 1233, 1250 (2002).
232. Joseph Russomanno, The “Central Meaning” and Path Dependence: The MadisonMeiklejohn-Brennan Nexus, 20 COMM. L. & POL’Y 117, 117-18 (2015).
233. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan, the Court held that public officials who sue for libel based
on speech relating to their official conduct must prove that the defamatory statement “was made with
‘actual malice’ – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.” Id. at 279-80.
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Alexander Meiklejohn on the necessities of political speech with those
of William Brennan, lawyer and jurist, on the practical effects of
litigation.”234
Given this theory’s importance in First Amendment law235 and
Meiklejohn’s status as its “leading proponent,” 236 a question logically
arises: whether Meiklejohnian philosophy of democratic selfgovernance would shield fake news – as defined and hypothetically
criminalized in this Article237 – from government censorship. As this
section argues, the answer is a resounding no.
This conclusion flows naturally from (1) the reasons why speech is
protected under a Meiklejohnian perspective, and (2) the occasions
when he believed it could rightfully be suppressed. They are briefly
described here.
For Meiklejohn, as Columbia University President Lee Bollinger
explains, “the principle of free speech plays a practical role for a selfgoverning society, protecting discussion among citizens so that they can
best decide what to do about the issues brought before them.” 238 More
simply phrased by Meiklejohn himself in Free Speech and Its Relation
to Self-Government, speech is protected to facilitate “the voting of wise
decisions.”239 He later elaborated in a law journal article that “[s]elfgovernment can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence .
. . that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express.”240
It is then, as Post writes, a “collectivist theory of the First
Amendment”241 under which “the minds of the hearers” 242 – the minds
of voters, in other words – take precedence over speakers’ rights. 243
Using the metaphor of a town hall meeting to emphasize this point,
Meiklejohn asserted that “[w]hat is essential is not that everyone shall
234. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS IN AMERICA 87 (1991).
235. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
521, 554 (1977) (“The most influential scholarly analysis of the First Amendment to be published since
World War II is Professor Alexander Meiklejohn’s Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government.”).
236. BUNKER, supra note 182, at 8.
237. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (providing this article’s definition of fake
news).
238. BOLLINGER, supra note 220, at 48.
239. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 45, at 25.
240. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 S UP. CT. REV. 245, 255
(1961).
241. Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note 227, at 1111.
See ROBERT C. POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 269 (1995) (“The most
influential exposition of the collectivist theory of the First Amendment is by the American philosopher
Alexander Meiklejohn; his work continues to inspire and guide the theory’s contemporary advocates.”).
242. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 45, at 25.
243. See id. (asserting that “in that method of political self-government, the point of ultimate
interest is not the words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers”).
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speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.”244 Speech is
protected at the meeting only as a means “to get business done” 245 and,
more specifically, to make voters “as wise as possible.”246 Such speech,
in turn, must “be fully and fairly presented” 247 as part of a “responsible
and regulated discussion.”248
Significantly, Meiklejohn seemingly provided no shelter to false
factual statements. As he wrote in 1961, referencing a storied aphorism
penned by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Schenck v. United
States,249
a man is not allowed to shout “Fire!” falsely in a theater. But, if,
during a performance in a theater, a person sees a fire which
threatens to spread, he is not only allowed, he is duty-bound, to try
to find some way of informing others so that a panic may not ensue
with its disastrous consequences.
The distinction between
“falsely” and “truly” is here fundamental to an understanding of
what freedom is. 250
As Meiklejohn ultimately concluded, “[i]t is the mutilation of the
thinking process of the community against which the First Amendment
to the Constitution is directed.” 251 With this primer on Meiklejohnian
theory in mind, it is readily apparent his theory would not protect fake
news – as defined here252 – from government censorship.
First and foremost, dissemination of fake news actually mutilates the
thinking process of the community by permitting voters to consider
information that is empirically verifiable as false. If a key tenet of
Meiklejohnian theory is that “the minds of the hearers” 253 constitute “the
point of ultimate interest”254 in political self-governance, then fake news
must be jettisoned from the field of speech and from Meiklejohn’s
metaphorical town-hall meeting due to its potential to confuse the minds
of those who hear it. Put more bluntly, propagation of fake news may
lead to the voting of troublingly unwise decisions, in direct
244. Id.
245. Id. at 23.
246. Id. at 25.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 23.
249. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Holmes opined that “[t]he most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” Id. at 52.
250. Meiklejohn, supra note 239, at 261-262 (emphasis in original).
251. Meiklejohn, supra note 45, at 26.
252. Supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
253. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 45, at 25.
254. Id.
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contravention of Meiklejohn’s final goal.
Second, Meiklejohn apparently would have no qualms or quibbles in
censoring individuals who knowingly create and trade in fake news. If,
as Meiklejohn believed, it is not essential that everyone shall speak, 255
then censoring individuals whose speech is not worth saying is
unproblematic. Using Meiklejohn’s words, the purveyors and mongers
of fake news are “out of order” 256 when they deal in fake news.
Third, Meiklejohn emphasized that all facts must “be fully and fairly
presented”257 as part of “responsible and regulated discussion.”258 The
knowing presentation to voters of empirically verifiable false facts on
issues of public concern constitutes a decidedly unfair and irresponsible
transmission of information. In brief, fake news is unfair information,
while those who knowingly convey it are irresponsible speakers.
Regardless of whether a speaker transmits fake news to deliberately
confuse an audience or to simply obtain an economic benefit via
immense internet clicks, the bottom line is that such speech finds no
shelter under Meiklejohnian theory. Additionally, as Section A
explained, the marketplace of ideas model would not safeguard fake
news from government censorship. Thus, two of the most important
rationales for shielding speech from suppression fail to offer any
resistance or opposition to a hypothetical statute criminalizing the
knowing creation and dissemination of fake news.
III. PROTECTING F AKE NEWS UNDER A S TRUCTURAL RIGHTS APPROACH:
RECONCILING DOCTRINE AND THEORY
Part I argued that a law criminalizing the knowing creation and
dissemination of fake news – a measure adopted in the interest of
preventing voter confusion259 – almost inevitably would not pass
constitutional muster. Specifically, under the doctrines of strict scrutiny
and underinclusivity, this Article’s hypothetical statute would surely be
struck down. 260
Yet, as Part II explained, neither the marketplace of ideas nor
democratic self-governance theories seemingly provide any shelter from
censorship for fake news. Because fake news, as defined in this

255. See id. (“What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying
shall be said.”) (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 23.
257. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
258. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
259. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (identifying the interests underlying the
hypothetical statute in this article).
260. Supra Part I.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss1/3

34

Calvert et al.: Fake News and the First Amendment: Reconciling a Disconnect Betwe

2018]

FAKE NEWS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

133

Article, 261 neither promotes truth discovery nor leads to wise voting, it
ostensibly could be banished per these theories. 262
Such a disconnect between the First Amendment doctrine and theory
is far from new. Lamenting what he called “the sorry state of First
Amendment doctrine,”263 Robert Post observed more than a dozen years
ago that the “First Amendment doctrine veers between theory and the
exigencies of specific cases.”264 This is problematic because, at least
ideally, “the function of doctrine is both to implement the objectives
attributed by theory to the Constitution and to offer principled grounds
of justification for particular decisions.”265 Post emphasized that
“[d]octrine becomes confused when the requirements of theory make
little sense in the actual circumstances of concrete cases, or when
doctrine is required to articulate the implications of inconsistent
theories. First Amendment doctrine has unfortunately suffered both
from these difficulties.”266
Is it possible, then, to reconcile First Amendment doctrine with free
speech theory when it comes to fake news or, at the very least, to
explain why First Amendment doctrine should protect fake news in the
face of conflicting free speech theory? Professor Steven Gey’s analysis
of why speech denying the Holocaust – speech that, like this Article’s
definition of fake news, is empirically verifiable as false – is
safeguarded by the First Amendment provides a possible path
forward.267 Gey examined the Holocaust denial issue through two First
Amendment lenses – a structural rights interpretation and an individual
rights interpretation. Ultimately, he concluded that only the former
understanding adequately explains why speech denying the existence of
the Holocaust merits First Amendment protection. 268
Structural rights, as Gey defined them, 269 are “constitutional
provisions that structure the government’s interaction with its citizens
and limit the power of government in order to prevent governmental
overreaching and ensure over the long term the preservation of popular

261. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (providing this article’s definition of fake
news).
262. Supra Part II.
263. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, in
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153, 172-73 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey
R. Stone eds., 2002).
264. Id. at 153.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Gey, supra note 48 (examining how a structural rights interpretation supports protecting
Holocaust-denial speech).
268. Id. at 17.
269. Gey, supra note 50, at 1.
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consent to the exercise of political power.”270 Put differently, a structural
rights perspective views the values of laws not in terms of the individual
benefits they may yield, but rather in terms of the freedom from
government control they produce. As Gey posited, a structural rights
interpretation “is entirely negative,” 271 concentrating only “on the
problematic nature of collective power.” 272 This contrasts directly with
an individual rights perspective, which focuses on “the social benefits
arising from speech”273 and the “beneficial character”274 of protected
speech.
Thus, as applied to the First Amendment, “[t]he core of the structural
rights justification for free speech is the claim that democratic selfgovernance is inconsistent with a regime that permits political majorities
to suppress free speech.”275 In other words, the government’s control
over speech as an intellectual arbiter of the truth must be constricted, if
not completely denied. 276 Baked into the architecture of the First
Amendment then – at least from a structural rights interpretation – is “a
deep skepticism about the good faith of those controlling the
government.”277 That skepticism flows from two facts: (1) decisions
about what is true or false, when made by those in power, “are bound up
with political perspectives that the government seeks to undermine;” 278
and (2) “the government’s natural tendency [is] to twist reality to its
own purposes.”279
One only needs to consider the current presidential administration’s
use of so-called “alternative facts”280 as a vehicle to try to dictate what is
true to understand Gey’s assertion above regarding the “government’s
natural tendency to twist reality to its own purposes.” 281 As Jim
Rutenberg of the New York Times contends, the Trump administration’s
communication “strategy has consistently presumed that low public
opinion of mainstream journalism (which Mr. Trump has been only too
happy to help stoke) creates an opening to sell the Trump version of
270. Id. at 4.
271. Gey, supra note 48, at 17.
272. Id. at 16.
273. Id. at 21.
274. Id. at 16.
275. Id. at 19.
276. See id. at 21 (“Under the structural interpretation, government is neither an intellectual nor a
moral arbiter.”).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 22.
279. Id.
280. See David Jackson, Conway Backs Spicer’s Version of ‘Facts,’ USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 2017,
at 3A (reporting the use of this term by White House counselor Kellyanne Conway during an interview
on Meet the Press to dispute crowd-size estimates for the inauguration of President Donald J. Trump).
281. Gey, supra note 48, at 22.
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reality, no matter its adherence to the facts.”282
The structural rights approach thus explains why the speech of both
Holocaust deniers and fake news purveyors must be shielded from
government control. In brief, the First Amendment must protect such
speech not because of any benefits it provides to either truth discovery
or voting wisely, but simply because a truly self-governing democracy
cannot allow those temporarily vested with power to dictate what is true
or false. As Gey encapsulated, the government
cannot suppress statements of fact simply because they are
demonstrably untrue and may lead astray those who hear the
statements and are too lazy or dim-witted to sort out truth from
falsehood. Under the structural interpretation, government has no
paternalistic role over matters of the intellect, just as it has no
paternalistic role over matters of the soul. It is up to individual
citizens alone to sort out truth from falsehood.283
In a nutshell, individuals who trade in fake news – “purveyors of
nonsense,”284 to borrow Gey’s fine phrase about Holocaust deniers – are
protected merely as “incidental beneficiaries of the ideological
agnosticism”285 that is part and parcel of a structural rights interpretation
of the First Amendment.
Gey’s structural rights interpretation of the First Amendment,
therefore, provides the intellectual glue holding doctrine and theory
together. While jettisoning fake news from the marketplace of ideas and
keeping it out of the hands of voters may yield benefits, these gains are
far outweighed by the danger of vesting the government with the power
to determine truth from untruth. 286 As Gey wrote, “[a]llowing the
government to encourage truthfulness by punishing falsehood has the
potential for lulling the citizenry into taking what the government says
at face value.”287 Ultimately, focusing on the negative consequences of
governmental interference with truth determinations in idea
marketplaces and at metaphorical town hall meetings explains why the
government must not be allowed to censor fake news.
Alexander Meiklejohn contended that in a self-governing democracy

282. Jim Rutenberg, ‘Alternative Facts’ and The Costs of Trump’s Brand of Reality, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2223, 2017, at B1 (emphasis added).
283. Gey, supra note 48, at 21.
284. Id. at 22.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 22.
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“there is only one group – the self-governing people”288 and that
“[r]ulers and ruled are the same individuals.”289 If that is correct, then
he too might embrace a structural rights perspective of democratic selfgovernance under which the “rulers” – those temporarily vested with
power – must not be granted separate authority to tell the “ruled” what is
and is not true. Similarly, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who “did not
believe in truth”290 and who recognized “no universal truths other than a
pragmatic recognition of the universal Hobbesian reality that in politics
the powerful always triumph over the powerless,”291 would surely
embrace a structural rights interpretation of the marketplace theory that
pushes back against government-dictated truths.
The bottom line is that a structural rights approach to the First
Amendment bridges the seeming disconnect between doctrine and
theory described in Parts I and II when it comes to criminalizing the
knowing creation and dissemination of fake news.
IV. CONCLUSION
“This story is FAKE NEWS and everyone knows it!”292
That’s how Donald J. Trump responded on Twitter in March 2017 to
allegations that his associates conspired with Russian officials to tilt the
2016 presidential election in his favor. 293 Although “fake news” is so
loosely bandied about today that some consider the term meaningless, 294
Trump’s fixation with it,295 renders its proscription plausible, 296 when
coupled with his virulent anti-press sentiment 297 and Hillary Clinton’s
288. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 45, at 6.
289. Id.
290. SMOLLA, supra note 3, at 8.
291. Gey, supra note 48, at 7.
292. See Susan Page, FBI Bombshell Creates ‘A Big Gray Cloud’ Over Trump’s White House,
USA TODAY , Mar. 2021, 2017, at 1A (quoting this tweet issued from President Trump’s personal
twitter account as one “of a string of early morning tweets” sent on Monday, March 20, 2017, by Trump
regarding the F.B.I.’s investigation into “whether Trump associates colluded with Russia in the effort by
one of the United States’ leading global adversaries to affect the outcome of the presidential
campaign”).
293. Id.
294. See Dave Itzkoff, The Same Show, but a Changed World, N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 8, 2017, at C1
(“The phrase ‘fake news’ has now been used so liberally, it’s meaningless.”).
295. See Kirsten Powers, Trumping Obama’s War with ‘Fox News’; ‘Fake News’ Rant is the Sort
of Bullying that Conservatives Used to Rage Against, USA TODAY , Feb. 21, 2017, at 7A (reporting that
Trump “relentlessly accuses non-conservative outlets of being ‘fake news’”).
296. See Kirsten Powers, Trumping Obama’s War with ‘Fox News’; ‘Fake News’ Rant is the Sort
of Bullying that Conservatives Used to Rage Against, USA TODAY , Feb. 21, 2017, at 7A (reporting that
Trump “relentlessly accuses non-conservative outlets of being ‘fake news’”).
297. Trump has derisively called the news media “the enemy of the American people.” Michael
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post-election call for regulating fake news. 298
Using a precise definition of fake news that involves only verifiable
falsehoods on matters of public concern,299 this Article asserted that
criminalizing it to prevent voter confusion assuredly violates First
Amendment doctrine. 300
Yet, two free speech theories – the
marketplace of ideas and democratic self-governance – upon which
much of that doctrine ostensibly is premised, would likely not safeguard
fake news from censorship. 301 In brief, the Article illustrated an
apparent disconnect between the First Amendment doctrine and theory.
The Article contended, however, that a structural rights interpretation
– one focusing neither on the benefits nor the “social good” 302 of speech,
but instead “on the problematic nature of collective power”303 – provides
ample philosophical fodder for why the First Amendment protects
empirically disprovable falsehoods like fake news from government
control. 304 Simply put, permitting the government to tell society what is
and is not true is treacherous, for it vests officials temporarily in charge
of the country with the power to twist narratives to serve their own
purposes.305
That is disturbingly akin to the function of the Ministry of Truth in
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. 306 Its “purpose was to dictate
and protect the government’s version of reality.” 307 As Professor Gey
said,
politicians’ claims of factual veracity should never be taken at face
value – even when there is independent evidence that the
government is actually correct. This is not to say that the
politicians are always wrong; it is to say that determinations of
right and wrong should not be in the hands of politicians.308
At bottom, the key is who gets to decide what content is appropriate
M. Grynbaum, Trump Calls News Media the ‘Enemy of the American People,’ N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1718,
2017, at A15.
298. Supra note 14 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (setting forth this article’s definition of fake
news).
300. Supra Part I.
301. Supra Part II.
302. Gey, supra note 48, at 15.
303. Id. at 16.
304. Supra Part III.
305. Gey, supra note 48, at 22.
306. Supra note 57 and accompanying text.
307. Flemming Rose & Jacob Mchangama, Shutting Down Fake News Could Move Us Closer to
aA Modern-Day ‘1984,’ WASH . P OST , Feb. 1012, 2017, at A17.
308. Gey, supra note 48, at 22.
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to circulate in the marketplace of ideas. Rodney Smolla posits that “[i]n
an open culture, that decision presumptively rests with speakers, not
government officials, high or petty.” 309 And while a self-governing
democracy might function better without fabulist litter like fake news
polluting the media ecosystem, trusting and relying on the government
to paternalistically sweep it away only lulls voters into both indifference
and passivity, rather than a “Holmesian skepticism” 310 about what is
true. As John Stuart Mill might have phrased it, people must reject such
“mental despotism.”311
Although the government must not manage fake news, it does not
logically follow that private actors and entities must be complacent. To
the contrary, individuals and businesses should combat fake news
through both counterspeech and self-regulatory mechanisms, such as
online social media platforms deploying algorithms to search for fake
news and asking readers to flag its existence. 312
If the government is to play any part in fighting fake news, its role
must be educational, not censorial. This means ramping up digital
media literacy efforts in the nation’s classrooms. 313 Such remedies are
especially important in an era when the nation’s president bypasses
traditional news media channels and delivers messages directly to
citizens via tweets. 314 Ultimately, fact-checking conducted by news
organizations and non-profit entities, along with both improved
educational efforts and self-regulatory mechanisms, provide effective
means for mitigating harms allegedly flowing from fake news while
simultaneously safeguarding First Amendment rights.

309. SMOLLA, supra note 3, at 5.
310. Gey, supra note 48, at 22.
311. MILL, supra note 191, at 96.
312. Supra Part I, Section A.
313. Id.
314. See Dan Colasimone, Donald Trump’s ‘Misinformation Ecosystem’: Q&A on Fake News
and the Role of the Media, ABC NEWS, Mar. 20, 2017, (stating how “[b]ecause of Twitter, he can go
directly to his audiences and say whatever he likes”).
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